Security reference for auditors - JBCF Forge

How to read this

This page consolidates the technical and privacy detail needed for an external security review, a vendor risk questionnaire, or a DPIA on Calculated Fields (Forge) for Jira Cloud. It is written for security architects, CISOs, DPOs, and external auditors.

JBCF Forge is a custom-field library running on Atlassian Forge. Most of its fields are read-only values derived from issue state; one field (ToDo List) is edited by users. The app writes the values of its own custom fields to Jira, and the contextual configuration of its own fields when settings are migrated from Data Center; it holds no other Jira write permission. It does not execute customer code and makes no outbound network calls outside Atlassian’s own APIs. The threat surface is intentionally narrow, and so is this page.

The authoritative references are:


Vendor information

Item Value
Vendor name JiBrok
Marketplace vendor profile Marketplace vendor 1216083
Marketplace listing Calculated and other custom fields for Jira Cloud (Forge)
Legal entity Registered in the Republic of Cyprus (European Union)
Years on Marketplace 10+ (Atlassian vendor since 2016)
Customer base 1,000+ company installations across JiBrok’s portfolio
App type Forge-native Cloud (Atlassian-hosted, Runs on Atlassian badge)
Support contact support@jibrok.com / JiBrok service desk
Privacy contact privacy@jibrok.com

App profile

Property Value
Hosting model Atlassian Forge (no vendor-managed infrastructure)
Runtime location Atlassian-managed; inherits the Jira Cloud site’s data residency region
Code execution model Vendor-published Forge functions only - no customer scripting, no template engine, no formula language
Jira write operations Limited to the app’s own custom-field values (write:app-data:jira) and the contextual configuration of its own fields, written by the JCMA migration receiver (write:custom-field-contextual-configuration:jira). Native Jira fields, comments, transitions and configuration are never modified. The ToDo List field is editable by users on the issue
Inbound interfaces exposed by the app Two Forge apiRoute REST endpoints (GET / PUT /todo/items) for customer scripts and integrations that read and replace ToDo List items, hosted and authenticated by Forge and guarded by app-specific custom scopes
Outbound network from the app Atlassian APIs only - no external: permissions, no Forge Remotes. Calls go to the site’s Jira REST API and to Atlassian’s Personal Data Reporting API
Sub-processors Atlassian (Forge platform) - one only
User base Configured by Jira admins; consumed by all Jira users who can view the issue
Data the app reads from Jira Issues, comments, changelog, links, project metadata, components, JSM SLA metrics, user references (accountId)
Data the app writes back to Jira The values of the app’s own custom fields, written through the Forge custom-field value channel (not by mutating native issue fields)

Compliance posture

JBCF Forge inherits the Forge platform’s certifications and operational guarantees from Atlassian. The vendor maintains its own organizational controls on top:

Layer Owner Coverage
Platform (Forge runtime, storage, identity, network) Atlassian Atlassian’s SOC 2, ISO 27001, ISO 27018, PCI DSS, GDPR, and regional certifications - see Atlassian compliance program
Vendor (JiBrok) organizational controls JiBrok SOC 2 Type II certification (evidence may be shared under NDA where appropriate - see Security and SOC Reports)
Vendor (JiBrok) data processing JiBrok DPA - JiBrok Cloud Apps (GDPR Art. 28)
Marketplace publication Atlassian + JiBrok Atlassian’s automated and human security review of every release
Vulnerability disclosure JiBrok Vulnerability Disclosure; participation in the Atlassian Marketplace Security Bug Bounty Program (Bugcrowd)

The customer’s data never leaves Atlassian’s infrastructure, so the regional certifications that apply to the customer’s Jira Cloud site apply directly to JBCF Forge as well.


Data classification

JBCF Forge reads a narrow slice of Jira state and writes the value of its own custom fields back into the issue via the Forge custom-field value channel. The classification below is by what the app touches by design, not what an individual customer’s instance happens to contain.

Data class Definition What JBCF Forge does with it
Personal data - account ID accountId, the Jira-internal identifier for a user Ten user-typed fields (last commenter, resolver, project lead, and similar) hold the user’s accountId in the value of the Jira field; Jira renders the name and avatar. Also stored for the assignee of a ToDo List item. Reported weekly to Atlassian’s Personal Data Reporting API so that account deletions and updates propagate
Business metadata Issue keys, project keys, statuses, components, link types, comment text, changelog entries Read at calculation time; the derived value (count, last-comment text, etc.) is what is published as the field value
Configuration JBCF field bindings, per-context configuration, ToDo templates Read/write to the app’s own Forge KVS namespace
System internal Service state (for example, recalculation progress) Read/write to the app’s own Forge KVS namespace. Calculated values are not copied into KVS; they exist only in the Jira field and are overwritten on the next issue event

JBCF Forge does not read or store:

  • User emails (the app does not request scopes that expose email)
  • Worklog content beyond what is needed for changelog reads
  • Jira admin configuration (no manage:* scopes, no delete:* scopes)
  • API tokens, OAuth tokens, or any credential material from Jira users

Threat model

The table below enumerates the principal threats relevant to a Forge app of this class and how each is mitigated.

Threat Mitigation Reference
Cross-tenant data leak Forge per-installation runtime and per-installation KVS namespace; no shared memory, queues, or filesystem between tenants Tenant isolation
Customer-side code injection Configuration is point-and-click; there is no scripting, no template engine, no formula language. Nothing a customer admin enters becomes executable code Security overview
Privilege escalation The app runs asApp() with two Jira write scopes, both confined to its own fields: write:app-data:jira for their values and write:custom-field-contextual-configuration:jira for their contextual configuration. Administrator actions (recalculation, Service Info, Migration from Connect) are checked server-side against the Jira administrator permission. It holds no manage:* and no delete:* scope, so it cannot change Jira configuration or remove Jira data regardless of who triggers a recalculation Why these permissions
Data exfiltration via outbound HTTP / SSRF Manifest declares no external: permissions and no Forge Remotes. The runtime has no HTTP client to a non-Atlassian endpoint Egress controls
Abuse of the app’s REST endpoints The two apiRoute endpoints (GET / PUT /todo/items) are Forge-hosted, callable only through the Atlassian platform with the platform’s own authentication, and additionally guarded by app-specific custom scopes granted at install time Why these permissions
Data exfiltration via Jira REST API The app only calls requestJira() (Forge-proxied, same-site only). Its Jira write permissions are limited to its own fields’ values and contextual configuration - an attacker who compromised the vendor’s deployment still could not modify native Jira fields, configuration, or delete data Why these permissions
Personal-data over-collection The manifest does not request read:me or user-email scopes. The personal data the app handles is limited to accountIds - in the values of ten user-typed fields and for ToDo List item assignees; account IDs are reported weekly to Atlassian’s Personal Data Reporting API so deletions propagate Personal data
Logging PII Diagnostic logs use [MONITOR] markers and are read through the Atlassian Forge App Logs API - vendor-visible only, pruned by the platform after 14 days. The app does not implement an automatic redaction layer, so the logs are treated as an operational vendor-visible surface Monitoring
Compromised Marketplace publication chain Atlassian-side automated and human review of every release; declarative permissions cannot expand silently - new scopes require admin re-consent on next install Code review and updates
Compromised Jira admin account Out of scope for the app - a compromised Jira admin can install or remove apps and configure custom fields regardless of vendor controls. Atlassian’s audit log is the canonical record Atlassian platform docs

There is no script engine and no integration channel that the customer wires into a third-party service. The app’s only inbound interface is the pair of Forge apiRoute REST endpoints behind the ToDo List field, which live inside the Forge platform and are authenticated by it. The threat surface is the Forge platform’s threat surface, scoped down by a permission set whose two Jira write scopes cover only the app’s own fields.


Access control

Who can install / configure

  • Install / uninstall: Jira site admins only - enforced by Atlassian Forge at the platform level. A regular Jira user cannot install or remove the app.
  • Configure custom fields: Jira admins (or users with the relevant custom-field admin permission) - enforced by Jira’s permission scheme, not by JBCF Forge.
  • Recalculation, Service Info, Migration from Connect: Jira administrators only - enforced server-side by JBCF Forge. Starting, cancelling, and estimating a recalculation, Service Info, and the Migration from Connect tab check the Jira administrator permission; anyone else gets You need Jira administrator permissions to use this action.
  • View calculated values: any Jira user who can view the issue and the field on the configured screen - enforced by Jira’s standard field-level permission model.
  • ToDo List panel: the panel returns the items of an issue only to a user with the Browse projects permission on that issue - checked by JBCF Forge.
  • Edit ToDo List items: any Jira user who can edit the issue and sees the field on the screen. The app’s REST endpoints behind that field are reachable only through Forge and require the app’s custom scopes.

JBCF Forge does not maintain its own user/role/permission system on top of Jira - its checks use the Jira permissions above. There is no separate JBCF account, no JBCF API key, no JBCF login.

Identity and authentication

  • Calculation and background work call Jira under the app’s own Forge platform identity (asApp()).
  • The app does not maintain session state of its own.
  • There is no JBCF-side login, password, MFA, or API token.

Audit trail

What JBCF Forge contributes

Source What it records Where Retention
Forge App Logs [MONITOR]-marked diagnostic events from the app’s resolvers and scheduled jobs Forge App Logs API (Atlassian-managed; available to the vendor in Atlassian’s UI) 14 days (Atlassian platform default)
Forge KVS Field bindings, per-context settings, service state, and ToDo templates (no copy of calculated values) Forge KVS, per-installation namespace Retained for the lifetime of the installation; deleted by Atlassian on uninstall

What Atlassian contributes

  • Atlassian audit log records app install/uninstall, admin-level configuration changes, and scope-grant events at the site level.
  • Atlassian-side incident logs are accessible to Atlassian and visible to customers through Atlassian’s standard support and audit channels.

JBCF Forge intentionally does not maintain a parallel audit store. Because the app writes only its own field values and is configured point-and-click by Jira admins, the existing Atlassian audit log plus the Jira issue history are the canonical record of what changed.


Privacy

Topic Detail
Personal data collected by the app The accountId of users returned by the ten user-typed fields (held in the value of the Jira field) and the accountId of a ToDo List item’s assignee. No emails, no display names, and no avatars are stored.
Personal data collected by the vendor outside the app Support correspondence sent voluntarily to support@jibrok.com / privacy@jibrok.com
Personal Data Reporting API usage Used. A weekly Forge scheduled trigger reports the account identifiers the app stores to Atlassian’s Personal Data Reporting API, which is how the app is informed about account deletion and update events
Data subject rights (GDPR Art. 15-22) Handled per the DPA - JiBrok Cloud Apps. Right-to-be-forgotten and right-to-rectification are propagated through Jira’s own personal-data lifecycle and the Personal Data Reporting cycle; the field value is overwritten on the next recalculation
Retention of personal data Calculated values are not kept in KVS; the value in the Jira field is overwritten on every recalculation triggered by an issue event; ToDo List items persist until a user edits or deletes them. On uninstall, the per-installation KVS namespace is deleted by Atlassian
Sub-processors Atlassian (Forge platform) - one only. See DPA section 6

Incident response

Channel Use for SLA
support@jibrok.com / JiBrok service desk Functional issues, calculated-value discrepancies, configuration help Best-effort response within one business day
support@jibrok.com (subject prefix SECURITY) Suspected security incident, data exposure concern, urgent escalations Triage within 24 hours; coordinated disclosure where applicable
Vulnerability Disclosure Reporting a vulnerability under coordinated disclosure Per the policy on that page
Atlassian Marketplace Security Bug Bounty Program (Bugcrowd) Researcher submissions for vendor’s Marketplace apps Per Bugcrowd’s terms
privacy@jibrok.com DSAR, DPA queries, GDPR-related requests Per the DPA and Atlassian’s processing timelines

For platform-level incidents (Forge outage, Jira Cloud incident, regional event), Atlassian’s statuspage is the authoritative source - JBCF Forge cannot operate independently of Forge availability.


Verification and evidence

Where to verify each claim:

Claim Where to verify
12 declared Jira and platform scopes plus 2 app-specific custom scopes; the two Jira write scopes are write:app-data:jira and write:custom-field-contextual-configuration:jira The installation consent prompt (authoritative for the version you install); Security overview - Why these permissions; the manifest reviewed by Atlassian
Runs on Atlassian badge The Marketplace listing
No outbound external: permissions, no Forge Remotes Marketplace listing; manifest under Atlassian review
SOC 2 Type II for vendor organizational controls SOC 2 Type II certification; evidence may be shared under NDA where appropriate - see Security and SOC Reports
GDPR DPA Public DPA - JiBrok Cloud Apps
Vulnerability disclosure policy Public Vulnerability Disclosure page
Forge platform guarantees (tenant isolation, data residency, encryption) Atlassian Forge documentation and Forge security architecture
Sub-processor list DPA section 6
Source-code review under NDA Available for enterprise customers on request via support@jibrok.com

Contact

  • Security inquiries: support@jibrok.com
  • Privacy and DPO inquiries: privacy@jibrok.com
  • Vulnerability reports: see Vulnerability Disclosure

JiBrok is registered in the European Union (Republic of Cyprus). For legal entity details, see the Trust Center.